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Has the Mental Health Act had its day?
Unjust discrimination against people with mental ill health should be replaced with universal rules
based on decision making ability, writes George Szmukler, but Scott Weich worries about legal
distractions that won’t improve outcomes while services are so thinly stretched
George Szmukler emeritus professor of psychiatry and society 1, Scott Weich professor of mental
health 2
1Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College, London; 2School of Health and Related Research (ScHARR), University of
Sheffield
Yes—George Szmukler
Patients with a “mental disorder” in England and Wales can be
detained and treated against their will on legal grounds that are
ethically unacceptable. These grounds contribute to the shadow
of coercion that hangs over the practice of psychiatry. The
relevant law remains fundamentally unchanged since the late
18th century.1
Two sets of rules exist for involuntary treatment—one for
psychiatry and one for the rest of medicine. In comparing them,
the discrimination against people with a mental illness becomes
obvious.2 3
In non-psychiatric cases, the person’s ability (or capacity) to
make a decision about treatment is key to whether over-riding
a refusal can be justified.4 A refusal made with capacity is
respected no matter what the health outcome might be. Even
when capacity is lacking, an involuntary intervention is justified
only if it is deemed to be in the person’s “best interests.” In
assessing “best interests” the patient’s personal values, beliefs,
and commitments have a powerful role.5
Capacity and best interests
These two considerations—capacity and best interests—have
almost no role in initiating involuntary treatment in psychiatry.
Two entirely different criteria operate: firstly, the presence of
a “mental disorder,” largely undefined; secondly, a perceived
“risk” to the person’s health or safety or of harm to others. Thus,
autonomy (or the recognition of a right to self determination or
to pursue personal goals and values) is not accorded the same
respect as among patients with a non-psychiatric diagnosis.
In a pluralistic society such as ours, such attention to values is
hugely important. The significant shift in medicine from
“paternalism” to patient self determination over the past 50
years has passed psychiatry by.1
Furthermore, the protection of other people in the “risk” criterion
makes people with mental disorders uniquely liable to a form
of preventive detention (albeit usually, or eventually, in hospital)
on the basis of risk alone.2 3 They can be detained, unlike the
rest of us, without first having committed an offence (or without
being strongly suspected of having done so) and despite the fact
that only a tiny proportion of violent offenders have a mental
illness.6
The blurred boundary of what constitutes a “mental disorder”
may widen the net for involuntary detention to include some
people who are deemed to pose a threat to social order. Justice
requires that all people posing an equal risk should be equally
liable to preventive detention.
We have accepted such discrimination for so long because of
deeply rooted, stigmatising stereotypes of people with mental
illness—that is, that they are incapable of exercising judgment
and that dangerousness is intrinsic to mental illness. Mental
health law is shaped by both assumptions.
The blurred boundary of what constitutes a “mental
disorder” may widen the net for involuntary detention
to include some people who are deemed to pose a
threat to social order
Can we create a legal framework that is non-discriminatory?
Indeed we can.3 7 Such a framework is based on decision making
ability and best interests but also incorporates the regulation of
detention and involuntary treatment with strong human rights
protections. Robust assessments, with high agreement between
assessors, can be made.8 A key point is that the law must be
generic: namely, that it applies to everyone who has a problem
with decision making, whether the diagnosis is physical or
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psychiatric, and in any setting—medical, surgical, psychiatric,
or in the community. A specific “mental health” law is not
necessary: the law should be formulated so as to apply
throughout all medical specialties, from psychiatry to
orthopaedics.
Fusion law can work
A “fusion law,”3 covering mental health and mental capacity,
is an example of such a generic law that Northern Ireland is due
to implement in 2018. Fears that such a law will fail to protect
the public are unfounded.1 9
The moral case for reforming mental health law is decisive. The
discrimination such law entails can no longer be supported. The
solution for eliminating this discrimination is a generic law.
Northern Ireland has taken the groundbreaking step of enacting
such a law10; we are sure to see more like it in the future.
No—Scott Weich
A world without compulsory mental health treatment is a
commendable ambition. Psychiatrists are often accused of
paternalism and coercion, and we know that compulsory
treatment stigmatises patients, causes rifts in social networks,
and disrupts therapeutic alliances. Never having to “section”
anyone would make our work immeasurably easier. But it would
substantially disadvantage those most in need of help.
It is unacceptable that more than 60 000 people were subject to
the Mental Health Act (MHA) in England last year11 and that
black patients are three times more likely to be admitted
compulsorily than their white counterparts.12
The United Nations has said that the United Kingdom, and all
signatories to the Convention of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), should repeal legislation authorising
compulsory treatment in healthcare.13 The UK government has
therefore commissioned another costly review of the MHA.
Instead of tackling the parlous state of mental health services
we’re about to embark on further protracted legalistic debate.
What, then, of “fusion” legislation, which argues for compulsory
treatment only when decision making capacity is impaired,
irrespective of cause? Sadly, it’s not CRPD-compliant. Legal
minds will be challenged to find a way around the fundamental
CRPD principle that disability is a wholly social phenomenon,
for which substituted decision making (in the best interests of
people incapable of making decisions for themselves) is never
permissible.14 15
Capacity based legislation seems great from a moral perspective:
like parity of esteem and personal autonomy, it’s impossible to
argue against equality under the law for people with physical
and mental illnesses.
People in distress would go without help
So, why don’t we abandon the MHA, as in Northern Ireland?
Because it won’t obviate the need for compulsory
treatments—and won’t placate the UN as things stand. But,
more importantly, lives would be lost, and more people in
distress would go without help. It would mean contravening
other human rights, including the rights to health, liberty, justice,
and life.15 The most vulnerable people would probably suffer
most.
The MHA allows for compulsory treatment based on evidence
of mental disorder plus risk. Restricting this to people judged
to lack capacity would inevitably mean some going without
treatment, even when it would be in their best interest.
Judgments about mental capacity are notoriously complicated
and variable. Assuming (or overestimating) capacity to make
life changing decisions poses tremendous risks.
Mental and physical illnesses differ. Mental disorders in general,
and several specific conditions such as schizophrenia and mania,
commonly lead to impairments in decision making capacity.16
Moreover, many patients approve of surrogate treatment
retrospectively.17
The law is not the problem. Only properly resourced mental
health services can reduce rates of compulsion and assure decent,
humane outcomes for patients and their families. Because UK
services are so thinly stretched, abandoning the MHA would
discriminate against people with mental illness by denying them
care.
The act ensures that people get help
One of the paradoxes of the MHA is that its application obliges
services to provide care.18 Only patients deemed most at risk
can access psychiatric beds. In other words, they get help only
because the MHA (that is, the law) demands that they get
treatment. Consequently, psychiatric wards are more disturbed
than ever. The number of patients detained after being admitted
voluntarily has increased by more than 15% per year recently,11
and this year record numbers of mental health staff have reported
being assaulted.
Psychiatric bed numbers inversely mirror compulsory
admission rates, and reductions predict compulsory
admission rates in the next year
The determinants of compulsion in mental healthcare are more
social than legal. From 2010 to 2015 NHS mental health budgets
fell by an estimated 8.25%, local authority social care budgets
fell 13.2%, and over 2000 psychiatric beds were closed.19
Psychiatric bed numbers inversely mirror compulsory admission
rates, and reductions predict compulsory admission rates in the
following year.20
And, although black patients are more likely to be assessed and
admitted compulsorily than white patients, there is no evidence
that ethnicity influences the outcome of MHA assessments.21
We can’t divorce the law from its setting. Focusing on the MHA
is looking too far downstream and is a dangerous distraction.
Unless services are properly resourced, changing the law won’t
make things better for patients, and it might make them very
much worse.
The authors are taking part in the 56th Maudsley debate, “This house
believes that fundamental reform of the Mental Health Act is required
to reduce discrimination and unnecessary detention,” on 22 November
2017 at King’s College, London.
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